The recent episodes of financial turmoil in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina are often dubbed financial crises. However, the severe downturns in equity markets, abrupt currency devaluations, and massive capital flight that characterize these events can still be deemed compatible with efficient and functioning financial markets. Thus, why is a financial crisis a "crisis?" To answer this question, we conduct an empirical investigation of the efficiency and pricing of the emerging ADR market. More specifically, using a non-parametric technique, we test for regime shifts in two basic structural relationships for ADR returns in 20 emerging countries, identified via arbitrage and capital mobility considerations. We find that "normal" market conditions were violated in proximity of financial crises: The law of one price often ceased to hold, and domestic sources of risk became more important for many depositary receipts in our sample. We also find that some popular explanations for the occurrence of financial crises in emerging economies, in particular uncertainty among investors, exchange rate volatility, economic integration, and liquidity (but not financial integration, currency devaluations, or capital flight) made their equity markets less efficient as well. Based on this evidence, we can state with greater confidence that those episodes of financial turmoil were indeed "crises."
Introduction
What is a financial crisis? The prevalent answer to this question, in academia as well as in the financial press, is that financial crises are episodes of turmoil in domestic and global financial markets. Such turmoil is generally characterized by sudden, severe, often deemed "excessive," downward price movements, scarce or drying liquidity, rapid reversals of capital flows, and contagious propagation of shocks across stock, currency, and sovereign debt markets. As a consequence, the events that took place in Mexico at the end of 1994, in East Asia between 1997 and 1998, in Russia during the summer of 1998, in Brazil in 1999, and in Argentina in 2002 are usually dubbed "financial crises."
Another question does, however, arise from this broad definition: Why is a financial crisis a "crisis?" After all, large declines in returns and portfolio shifts, significant capital flights, and the reduced willingness of speculators to take positions in certain assets may result from rational, albeit rapid, revisions of investors' beliefs about the fundamentals of the traded securities. The word "crisis" is instead suggestive of market breakdowns or failures, seemingly irrational behavior of investors and speculators, or inefficient allocation of resources and risks, hence, in short, of the occurrence of unusual, possibly irrational phenomena.
The objective of this paper is to address those questions directly. More specifically, we intend to assess the efficiency of emerging capital markets in proximity of recent examples of international financial instability. To that purpose, we identify some basic arbitrage and pricing relationships which, even after allowing for frictions and transaction costs, should always hold in these markets, when efficient. Then, we test whether they fail to do so during those times of "crisis." We focus on the market for emerging American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). ADRs are dollar-denominated rights, priced in the U.S. stock market, to shares of foreign companies traded in their domestic exchanges. According to Bailey et al. (2000) , ADRs account for much trading in emerging market equities. Depositary receipts allow in fact investors to trade in more transparent and liquid markets (the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX) than those of the issuers.
More importantly, the ADR market represents an ideal environment to determine whether the efficiency of the emerging equity markets deteriorates during periods of financial stress. In each of those markets, in fact, ADRs and their corresponding amounts of shares of the domestic issuers should always be perfect substitutes. Most of the available research on the subject (see Section 2) argues that this is generally the case, in the absence of investment restrictions, when taxes, transaction costs, liquidity, and nonsynchronicity issues are considered. This implies that the relationship between the dollar return for a depositary receipt and the dollar return for the underlying security should always satisfy the law of one price, even after accounting for those financial frictions, unless "normal" market conditions are violated.
Further, in perfectly open, fully integrated financial markets, ADR prices should be related exclusively to their covariance with world factors. Most emerging economies have experienced some form of capital market liberalization in the last decade. As a result of this process, foreign investors can now trade in domestic assets and domestic investors in foreign assets. However, since investors' portfolios still display significant home bias (e.g., Tesar and Werner, 1995a) , local sources of risk could affect ADR prices as well. These factors may become even more relevant during episodes of financial turmoil. Many of these events have been associated with the occurrence of purely idiosyncratic shocks, like political instability, fiscal crises, monetary indiscipline. In addition, in several of those circumstances (most notably in the case of Malaysia in the late 1990s), local authorities reacted to generalized sales of domestic assets by erecting new barriers to capital flows, pegging unilaterally their currencies, and limiting the activities of foreign speculators, hence segmenting back their financial markets. 1 The dollar return for a depositary receipt should then become more sensitive to the dollar return for the local index where the underlying security is traded and less sensitive to the dollar return for an index of its own trading venue if, in proximity of periods of stress, "normal" pre-existing market conditions are violated.
Testing for and explaining regime shifts in the efficiency and pricing of emerging ADR markets is therefore the subject of this work. We start by translating the arbitrage and market integration arguments made above into two linear relationships between returns for each ADR in the sample, its corresponding local stock, and domestic and global sources of risk. Our basic dataset comprises weekly dollar returns for ADRs from issuers in 20 emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Venezuela. The choice of lower frequency data alleviates the potential impact of infrequent, nonsynchronous trading and various microstructure frictions on the statistical analysis (e.g., Harvey, 1995) . Next, we search for breaks in these relationships using the non-parametric statistical methodology developed by Bai et al. (1998) . This approach allows statistical inference on the nature of those breaks (and the estimation of confidence intervals around the estimated break dates) with minimal restrictions on the behavior of the involved variables before and after they occurred. Moreover, these endogenous dates are unaffected by any prior analyst's bias about when the break is expected to happen.
We find that the law of one price did indeed cease to hold for many emerging depositary receipts in our sample in proximity of financial crises. Most of the estimated breaks in their basic no-arbitrage relationships cluster in 1994, between 1997 and 1998, and by the end of 2001. In those circumstances, the correlation between ADR returns and the dollar returns of their perfect substitutes weakened considerably, especially in Chile, Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela. These shifts were often accompanied by greater dependency of ADR prices on domestic equity index returns, with few exceptions (e.g., Argentina), and were generally unrelated to the introduction of capital controls or endogenous dates of financial integration. Based on this evidence, we conclude that, during the various episodes of financial turmoil that took place over the last decade, the market for emerging ADRs was, on average, less efficient, more segmented, and relatively more sensitive to domestic sources of risk than during more tranquil times. As interestingly, however, those episodes of financial turmoil were not accompanied by any discernible market failure in the ADR pricing of at least half of the companies in our database, most notably in Brazil, China, and India.
Our analysis goes a step further. We intend in fact to explain the occurrence, dynamics, and clustering of these regime shifts, as well as the heterogeneous response of each country's ADRs to their appearance. To accomplish this task, we consider a number of popular arguments in the literature (described in Section 6) to explain timing and evolution of financial crises. We devise various proxies for them, which can be grouped into six main categories: information, trend, economic environment, investors' activity, market liquidity, and expected returns. We then include these variables in a Poisson model for the concentration of estimated breaks in each country in the sample. Its estimation indicates that greater confusion among foreign investors and exchange rate volatility, declining expected returns and liquidity, and shrinking trade (but not abrupt currency devaluations or foreign capital flight) make emerging ADR markets more likely to become less efficient and integrated.
This work is closely related to a recent study of the Asian crisis by Kallberg et al. (2002a) . In that paper, the authors found that simple linear relationships between equity and currency markets of several East Asian countries suffered statistically significant breaks during 1997 and 1998 and linked those instances only to herding by foreign investors. These structural dependencies, however, do not naturally arise from normal market conditions and are not bound to hold dynamically, hence could have shifted over time regardless of whether those markets were experiencing a "crisis." Our effort to identify and explain financial crises from specific market failures, consistent with their nature of "unusual" events, represents, to our knowledge, an original contribution to the growing body of economic and financial literature on these fascinating, yet still obscure phenomena.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identifies the basic efficiency and pricing relationships between ADR returns and their substitutes, as well as local and global sources of risk. Section 3 details the econometric approach to testing for breaks in these relationships. Section 4 describes the dataset employed in the analysis. Section 5 summarizes our estimation results. Section 6 investigates the significance of several alternative explanations for the occurrence and clustering of the regime shifts measured in Section 5. Section 7 concludes.
Efficiency and pricing for ADR returns
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are dollar-denominated, negotiable certificates representing a pre-specified amount of a foreign company's publicly traded equity, held on deposit in the issuer's domestic market. The depositary banks pass all dividends and payments related to the underlying shares, converted into U.S. dollars, to the holders of the ADRs, which therefore bear all currency risk and pay handling fees to the custodians. ADRs allow investors to achieve international diversification while avoiding hefty local fees (up to 40 basis points, according to Velli, 1994) and trade failures, common especially in emerging markets. 2 There is a voluminous literature on international cross-listings, the efficiency of the ADR market, and the pricing of depositary receipts. Karolyi (1998) provides an extensive survey of this branch of international finance. Available research on the topic concentrated mainly on the impact of international listings on market price behavior, the risk and cost of capital of the issuers, the liquidity of their stocks, and the diversification opportunities for investors.
The holder of an ADR can redeem his certificate into the underlying shares at any point in time by simply paying a small service charge to the custodian. Conversely, new ADRs can be created at any point in time by simply depositing the appropriate number of those shares in the custodian's hands. Hence, in the absence of significant investment barriers and accounting for fluctuations in the exchange rate, ADRs and the underlying equity should be perfect substitutes. If r m it is the dollar return for the shares of company i in country m at time t and r US it is the dollar return for the corresponding depositary receipt at time t, the null hypothesis of perfect substitutability between the two securities implies that, in the relationship
both a i = 0 and b i = 1. However, differential taxation rules (e.g., on the treatment of dividends), restrictions to capital mobility and foreign ownership of domestic stocks, involuntary dilution of ADR-holders' claims (due to S.E.C. rules on the exercise of rights), limited liquidity, and nonsynchronous trading may limit the efficient realignment of the dollar prices of ADRs and corresponding domestic stocks only within no-arbitrage bands such that a i 6 = 0 and/or b i 6 = 1. Most available studies (e.g., Rosenthal, 1983; Kato et al., 1992; Webb et al., 1995) conclude that the ADR market is at least weak-form efficient and that, after accounting for many of those frictions, the law of one price does indeed hold. One of the main objectives of this work is to test whether efficiency in the market for emerging ADRs is altered during periods of financial stress. Thus, we test whether the relations of Eq. (1) experience a regime shift in proximity of recent financial crises. Established theoretical research and much available empirical evidence support the case for international diversification. 3 Hence, if the international capital markets were fully integrated and perfect capital mobility held, returns on ADRs should depend only on their covariances with one or many global market factors. Instead, the existence of home bias among domestic investors leads local market dynamics to affect ADR prices as well. 4 The relevance of local factors may be even greater during periods of financial stress. Many of the recent episodes of financial turmoil raging through Asia and Latin America were in fact ignited or fueled by domestic events (e.g., political uncertainty, bank failures, explosive budget deficits, government defaults on bond payments).
In this paper we also test whether local market returns became more important in pricing emerging ADRs around the time of financial crises.
To that purpose, we employ a standard multi-factor model in which factors typically proxy for sources of domestic and global market risk. 5 The model can be written as
where r US RF t is the U.S. risk-free rate of return at time t, r m Mt is the dollar return on the local market portfolio of the ADR's underlying stock at time t, and r
US
Mt is the return on the U.S. market portfolio at time t. This relation allows us to test for changes in the degree of market segmentation and capital mobility in the context of the emerging ADR market, i.e., on whether b 
Testing for regime shifts
In this section we describe the methodology we use to test for breaks in the parameters of Eqs. (1) and (2) . We choose to adopt the statistical methodology of Bai et al. (1998) , since it allows statistical inference about structural breaks (including the estimation of confidence interval around the break dates) with minimal restrictions on the underlying data generation process (DGP). Indeed, Bai et al. (1998)'s non-parametric technique searches for a single break in univariate or multivariate time-series models (with or without stationary regressors), and generates asymptotic confidence intervals around it, requiring only that the DGP is a stationary vector autoregression (VAR) before and after the break.
We start by generalizing the efficiency and pricing models of Eqs. (1) and (2) 
where d t (k) = 1 if t ≥ k and zero otherwise, and S is a binary selection matrix with unit diagonal elements corresponding to the coefficients in β 
where Quandt (1958 Quandt ( , 1960 , considers the maximum of the following F process: 
Data
The basic dataset we use in this paper consists of weekly, continuously compounded, dividend-adjusted, U.S. dollar returns for all the Level 2 and Level 3 ADR stocks (i) traded at the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX (r 9 Level 2 and Level 3 ADRs require basic to full compliance with U.S. GAAP and SEC disclosure rules. We define as emerging economies the 26 countries included in the MSCI Emerging Markets Free Index (EMF), as of April 1, 2003, plus Hong Kong. 10 We ignore stocks for which no information on their trading venue was provided by BoNY, Level 1 ADRs, and Rule 144A (also known as RADRs). Those stocks, which require only minimal or no compliance with U.S. GAAP nor SEC disclosure, are in fact traded on the OTC (Over The Counter) or the PORTAL (Private Offerings, Resales, and Trading through Automated Linkages) systems with much less liquidity than exchange-listed securities (e.g., Karolyi, 1998) . We also ignore companies whose domestic and ADR shares had a short common trading history (100 weeks or less).
This filtering reduces our sample to joint time series of r m it and r US it , generally from inception to April 1, 2003 , for 156 stocks in 20 countries. These countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Venezuela. All pricing data were obtained from Datastream. We use weekly returns to control for market microstructure frictions and non-synchronous trading across stock markets, which often plague emerging ADR data at higher frequencies, while still allowing for intra-month price dynamics. Our database also includes weekly time series of three-month Treasury Bill rates (r US RF t ) and of dollar returns of 9 Http://www.adrbny.com/dr_directory.jsp. 10 Http://www.msci.com/licensing/derive.html. We add Hong Kong to the MSCI list because of the presence of many Chinese companies in that stock exchange. 
Estimating regime shifts
The first objective of this study is to test for whether the efficiency and pricing models for ADRs described in Section 2 experience a regime shift in proximity of financial crises. To that purpose, we apply the methodology of Bai et al. (1998) to Eqs. (1) and (2) for each of the 156 ADR stocks in our sample of 20 emerging markets.
11 Tables 1a and 2a report the resulting regression coefficients from the estimation of both models at the break dates deemed significant according to the Wald statistic of Eq. (5). To provide a benchmark for comparison, we also report country average estimates of Eqs. (1) and (2) for the ADRs which did not experience any such break in Tables 1b and 2b, respectively. As an example of the analysis underlying these tables, Figure 1 displays the dynamics of F The evidence in Table 1a suggests that a majority of the depositary receipts in our sample experienced a regime shift in their basic arbitrage relationships during the past decade. Indeed, we find that a statistically (and economically) significant break occurred in the parameters of Eq. (1) for 80 of the 156 emerging market ADRs described in Section 4. These breaks are due on average to decreased dependence of the ADRs' dollar returns (r US it ) 11 The correlations between r . 12 The 5% confidence interval from Eq. (6) is between March 31, 1998 and January 19, 1999 for the former, and between January 6, 1998 and July 6, 1999 for the latter. Table 1b are in fact much greater (smaller), and not statistically different from one (zero) more often than in Table 1a . Further, most of the estimated breaks took place around the time of the latest episodes of financial turmoil: The scatter plots of estimated break dates in Figure 2a show that regime shifts in Eq. (1) cluster during the events of Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2002). Hence, many of the recent financial crises involving emerging economies were accompanied by lower efficiency in the ADR market, especially in Chile, Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela. The analysis at the country level presents, however, a less homogeneous picture. Table 1a reveals in fact that many estimated realignments were in the direction of the law of one price: The average shift c ∆b i is actually positive, pushing b i toward one, for 8 of the 16 countries (and 40 of the 80 companies) where we found statistically significant breaks in Eq. (1), most notably in Brazil, China, and India.
According to Figure 2b , many of these arbitrage breaks were accompanied by statistically significant regime shifts in the relationship between excess ADR dollar returns and domestic and global sources of risk (Eq. (2)). In particular,
.78 for 54 of the 80 companies for which the corresponding Wald statistic was significant as well in Table 1a . Further, Table 2a reports that c ∆b m i is positive on average for 79 ADRs, and either positive or negative but economically negligible in 12 different countries in our sample. Therefore, not only was the market for emerging ADRs generally less efficient, but also local market returns became more relevant to their pricing in proximity of financial crises. When compared to the benchmark estimates of Table 2b , this evidence suggests that, with few exceptions (e.g., Argentina and Venezuela), most recent episodes of financial turmoil entailed more intense generation of information in the less liquid local markets of emerging economies than in the U.S. stock markets. The lower covariance of ADR returns with world factors indicates that many emerging equity markets became less integrated and capital flows less mobile during those events, as argued in Sections 1 and 2.
Explaining regime shifts
Based on the evidence presented in the previous section, we conclude that periods of financial stress make the market for emerging ADRs, on average, less efficient, more segmented, and more sensitive to local sources of risk than in more tranquil times. In particular, we learned from Figure 2 that most of the statistically significant regime shifts in the efficiency and pricing relationships for ADRs described in Section 2 concentrate in the winter of 1994 (at the time of the Mexican peso crisis), in the second half of 1997 (during the turmoil in East Asia), in the summer of 1998 (in correspondence with the collapse of the ruble and the LTCM debacle), in the first few months of 1999 (at once with the Brazilian fiscal crisis), and lastly at the end of 2001 (when Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt). Nonetheless, we also found a significant degree of heterogeneity in the response of each country's ADRs to those shocks. Finally, these responses cannot be easily justified by swift, idiosyncratic changes in the domestic regulatory environment affecting (directly or indirectly) ADR trading. For example, in the most notable case of introduction of capital control measures, Argentina between 2001 and 2002, the majority of estimated regime shifts in Eqs. (1) and (2) took place before the restrictions to capital flight (described in Auguste et al., 2002) were announced and implemented.
In short, these results seem to suggest that protracted periods of economic and financial instability did indeed translate into important shifts in the efficiency of emerging capital markets and meaningful realignments of the pricing factors driving their dynamics. In the remainder of the paper, we intend to explain why these shifts took place during the many crises occurred in the last decade. To that purpose, we introduce some new variables. The first is E m t , the number of companies in country m whose ADRs are experiencing a statistically significant break in the efficiency relationship of Eq. There is an increasing body of theoretical and empirical studies attempt-ing to explain why financial crises occur and how they manifest. 13 Local macroeconomic and microeconomic weaknesses, market failures, or the seemingly irrational behavior of traders and speculators are among the most plausible and frequently mentioned interpretations of those phenomena. Fiscal or trade imbalances (e.g., Eichengreen et al., 1996) , high levels of dollardenominated corporate borrowing (e.g., Thurow, 1998), or political instability may all make the domestic economy and financial markets more vulnerable to external and internal shocks, as well as to speculative attacks. Excessive volatility and comovement or shrinking liquidity have also been related to the occurrence of contagious financial crises. In particular, many papers have argued that the trading activity of (foreign or domestic) investors or speculators contribute to destabilize local equity markets (e.g., Choe et Pasquariello, 2002) . There is also some agreement that the interaction of stock and foreign exchange markets plays a crucial role in those crises (Corsetti et al., 1998; Park and Lee, 2001 ). Finally, financial market crises may be self-fulfilling (e.g., Obstfeld, 1998) or stem from the (rational or "irrational") behavior of hedge funds, pension funds, and mutual funds. 14 We want to determine the relevance of these considerations in explaining the clustering and dynamics of efficiency and pricing shifts for emerging ADRs in proximity of episodes of financial turmoil. To accomplish this task, we consider a number of proxies for those arguments which can be grouped into seven categories: Information, trend, economic environment, financial integration, investors' activity, market liquidity, and expected returns.
Information
The first group contains financial variables related to information. It is often argued that information asymmetry and heterogeneity among investors contribute to the occurrence, severity, and propagation of financial crises. 15 Time-varying uncertainty and disagreement may also explain the adjustment in the relative importance of local sources of risk in ADR returns. We use domestic and U.S. market return volatility (σ 
Trend
Generalized purchases or sales of assets within a market, motivated either by imitation, injections and redemptions of cash in mutual funds, the activity of momentum fund managers, or by rational or irrational bubbles, may also alter the link between ADR prices and their underlying assets. However, the effects of these activities on the efficiency and pricing of ADRs would differ depending on the direction of the ensuing trends in the financial markets involved. Indeed, Yuan (2000) and Kyle and Xiong (2001) have argued that financial crises are more likely to occur when short-selling, borrowing, and wealth constraints induce rational speculators to trade regardless of fundamentals. The main implication of these arguments is that violations of the arbitrage relation of Eq. (1) or shifts in the relative importance of local or global sources of risk for ADR returns should be more likely during a bear market or a correction, i.e., when those financial constraints are more binding for investors. The second group of variables therefore attempts to measure prolonged, asymmetric runs in the aggregate domestic and U.S. return series. More specifically, we devise two sets of dummy measures d 
Economic environment
Our third group of variables provides information on the dynamics of the local and U.S. economic environment. Many recent financial crises were ignited by pressures on the domestic currency. Bailey et al. (2000), Kallberg et al. (2002a) , and Pavlova and Rigobon (2003), among others, explicitly studied the empirical and theoretical relation between currency and equity markets in proximity of episodes of financial turmoil. Instability in the exchange rate market may affect both Eqs. (1) and (2) either directly (when altering the terms of trade between ADRs and underlying assets) or indirectly (by virtue of its impact on the domestic and U.S. stock markets). In this paper, we use the standard deviation of weekly returns for the exchange rate between the domestic currency for country m and the dollar (r F X mt from Datastream) over the past 100 weeks, σ F X mt , to measure the stability of that country's foreign exchange market. Not only the volatility of the exchange rate, but its direction may be relevant as well. Emerging economies, and their ADRs, may in fact react differently to continuing appreciation or depreciation of the domestic currency, depending on their exposure to foreign currency-denominated debt, their dependence on imports, or the importance of foreign markets for their products and services. To account for this possibility, we introduce an additional set of dummies equal to one if the local currency has been depreciating (d The degree of economic integration of a country is also going to affect its sensitivity to fluctuations of the exchange rate. As in Bekaert et al. (2002), we proxy for it with monthly ratios of exports plus imports divided by GDP (from IFS), T m t , which capture the size of each country m's trade sector. 16 Finally, we are interested in measuring how current and expected macroeconomic conditions are going to affect a country's ability to fulfill its obligations toward creditors. Indeed, when these conditions deteriorate, investors tend to move away from its capital markets. We use the foreign currency sovereign credit rating history from Standard & Poors to construct monthly series C m t of numeric rating shifts (from a high of 26 for AAA to a low of 1 for Default) as an (albeit imprecise) proxy for the ex ante credibility of country m's economic policies.
Financial integration
Over the past fifteen years, most of the emerging economies in our sample experienced significant regulatory changes which have furthered their financial integration with the rest of the world. As a result of these changes, domestic investors gained access to investments in foreign assets, and foreign investors to domestic assets. This process of market integration has affected expected returns, their correlation with world factors, the cost of capital, and volatility (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey, 1995 , 1997 .
These changes may have affected the market for ADRs as well. More specifically, it is reasonable to imagine that, as a consequence of capital market liberalization, domestic and foreign investors and speculators gained greater access to both depositary receipts and their underlying stocks, thus altering (and possibly realigning) not only the arbitrage relationships between ADR and local prices but also their dependence on local and global sources of risk. To test for the validity of this argument, we therefore need to account for the occurrence of liberalization events in our sample. Measuring and dating the process of market integration represents, however, a very difficult task. Indeed, this process generally involves a series of complex, gradual steps whose relative ultimate impact on the degree of financial market openness of a country is often extremely difficult to assess. Thus, we employ the chronology of financial integration generated by Bekaert and al. (2002) , since it measures endogenous market integration rather than exogenous market liberalization. These dates, although usually later than dates of official capital market reforms, result in fact from model-free, non-parametric specifications which nonetheless control for many financial and macroeconomic variables likely related to the integration process. In particular, we define a dummy I m t equal to one if t is greater than (or equal to) the lower bound of the confidence interval for the estimated integration date reported by Bekaert et al. (2002) in the last column of their Table 2 and equal to zero otherwise. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) were the first to observe that speculative trading activity makes capital markets more efficient by augmenting the information content of prices. In that respect, foreign speculators may play an especially important role in emerging markets, where liquidity is often poor, generation, acquisition, and dissemination of information are still insufficiently standardized, and price manipulation is more likely (see Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) . Foreign speculators would therefore improve the efficiency of the market for emerging ADRs and affect the contribution of local and global sources of risk to their prices by enhancing their informational and allocational properties.
Investors' activity
Foreign investors have, however, also been accused of destabilizing emerging capital markets. Short-term trading by foreign speculators and the portfolio rebalancing activity of institutional investors are frequently blamed by the financial press for exacerbating the propagation of shocks across markets. Moreover, recent empirical evidence (e.g., Kaminsky et al., 2000 Kaminsky et al., , 2001 linked redemptions and injections of underlying investors in mutual funds to emerging markets crises. Under this scenario, more intense trading activity by foreign investors in the domestic markets would negatively affect these markets' ability to process information (hence altering the parameters of Eq. (2)) and to ensure that no-arbitrage conditions are satisfied (hence lowering the parameter b i in Eq. (1)).
We test for the validity of these conflicting arguments by introducing a new set of variables, F m t , as proxies for signed net trading activity by foreign investors in the emerging equity markets in our sample. In particular, following Tesar and Werner (1995b), we define F m t as the net monthly equity capital flows (in millions of dollars) for country m, from the U.S. Treasury Bulletin, for the corresponding week t.
Market liquidity
Our sixth group of variables tries to measure the liquidity in each of the markets where ADRs and underlying stocks are traded. There is some anecdotal evidence that, during financial crises, the number of speculators willing to trade domestic assets dwindles, thereby reducing local market liquidity and moving prices away from fundamentals. Along these lines, shrinking liquidity would then explain why prices of depositary receipts departed from basic no-arbitrage relations or became more sensitive to global factors. Vice versa, periods of greater market liquidity would translate in higher correlation between r US it and r m it and greater sensitivity of ADR returns to local sources of risk.
In addition, it has been argued that when a security trades at multiple locations, ceteris paribus, insiders would choose to trade in the more liquid venue since the impact of their actions on the equilibrium prices is going to be lower (e.g., Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991). Then, shifts in the relative liquidity of the markets for ADRs and local stocks would affect the relative pricing of those securities and the relative importance of domestic and U.S.-originated information production in r 
Expected returns
Finally, we consider the possibility that relative changes in expected returns alter the efficiency and pricing of ADRs. Relative information shocks, the process of market liberalization, or shifts in the investors' perception of (diversifiable and non-diversifiable) local and U.S. risks may sway investors' expectations and preferences for local versus U.S. equities, therefore permanently altering the existing links between domestic, global, and ADR returns. To bring this proposition to the data, we need to estimate expected returns in the markets where depositary receipts and their underlying securities are traded. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) have argued that changes in dividend yields are effective measures for changes in expected returns of emerging capital markets. Hence, we use weekly time series of dividend yields from Datastream to define two new sets of variables, D m t and D US t , in each of the emerging markets in our sample and in the U.S. stock market. 17 
The analysis
We now test whether the various proxies devised above can explain the occurrence and clustering of the efficiency and pricing breaks reported in Tables  1a and 2a 
where i is the number of ADRs in country m experiencing a break in Eq.
(1), when Y 18 We impose that the parameter λ m t is related to our seven groups of regressors in terms of the following log-linear model
We estimate the parameters of Eq. (8) by maximum likelihood and report the results in Table 3 for Y Table 4 for Y m t = P m t for each emerging country m in our sample. 19 Our model appears to perform well in both cases. The Poisson model produces no obvious counterpart to the R 2 of 17 Dividend yields in the U.S. (D US t ) are characterized by a pronounced downward trend over the sample period, which can be in part ascribed to the increasing popularity of alternative payout policies (e.g., stock repurchases or stock rights) by U.S. corporations. No such trends can be identified for the emerging market dividend yields series (D US t ). 18 For more on models for count data, see Greene (1997, Chapter 19) . 19 For each country m, the sample over which Eqs. (7) and (8) are estimated starts on the first potential break date for the ADR with the earliest return data available (t 0 in Tables 3 and 4 ). The specification of Eq. (8) has no constant term to avoid the possibility of collinear regressors in the estimation. linear regressions. Yet, two alternative measures of goodness of fit based on standardized residuals (R 2 P ) and log-deviances (R 2 D ) are both mostly greater than 90%, while the chi-squared statistic (χ 2 ) rejects the null hypothesis that the slopes in Eq. (8) are all zero for all countries but Hong Kong and Poland in Table 3 and South Korea in Table 4 . Further, our evidence suggests that information asymmetry, domestic and U.S. economic conditions, and changes in relative liquidity and expected returns are the most relevant factors in explaining the clustering of efficiency and pricing breaks over the last decade.
More specifically, we find that the likelihood of an emerging ADR market to become less efficient and its prices more sensitive to local sources of risk is positively related to U.S. stock market volatility and negatively related to domestic equity volatility. Indeed, much trading in emerging market equities already takes place on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX during "tranquil" times. 20 More trading, especially if informed, may shift toward these more liquid venues during periods of turmoil. Consistently, greater divergence in liquidity (lower L m t and/or higher L US t ) explains as well the efficiency and pricing breaks in Tables 1a and 2a . Hence, greater information asymmetry, uncertainty, and disagreement makes the more liquid U.S. equity market the primary source of risk for ADR returns r US it in Eqs. (1) and (2) in proximity of financial crises.
Not surprisingly, the greater the fluctuations in the domestic currency, the more likely are ADR returns to violate the law of one price and to covary less with U.S. equity returns. However, the impact of the exchange rate on the efficiency and pricing of the emerging equity markets is symmetrically unrelated to its prolonged unidirectional swings: Coefficients for d It is in fact only for the Philippines that financial integration occurs within the time-frame of our sample. In that circumstance, the opening of its equity market to foreign investors improved its overall efficiency, since the coefficient for I m t is positive and significant in both Tables 3 and 4 . Thus, the breaks reported in Tables 1a and 2a cannot be explained by inflows and outflows of funds by foreign investors or by the regulatory changes which integrated many emerging capital markets with the rest of the world. Nonetheless, shifts in investors' expectations played an important role for the dynamics of E < 0 to be observed. ADR markets were instead on average more efficient, but more sensitive to local sources of risks, in response to higher D m t . In short, our findings suggest that many of the factors usually associated with the occurrence of financial crises in emerging economies, in particular increasing uncertainty and confusion among investors, greater exchange rate volatility, dwindling trade balances, unfavorable expectations, and worsening liquidity (but not financial integration, currency devaluations, or the disruptive flight of foreign capital), also contribute to make their emerging equity markets less efficient and more de facto segmented.
Conclusions
Financial crises have received increasing attention from the financial literature, not least in light of the tremendous social and allocational costs stemming from them. However, determining the nature of a financial crisis has not become as important and distinct an object of study as examining its consequences. Episodes of financial turmoil, especially in emerging economies, are instead often defined in terms of those consequences (abrupt price declines, currency devaluations, capital flight) rather than by the market breakdowns that the word "crisis" seems to imply. A clear understanding of the mechanisms by which these events take place is necessary to provide policy-makers with tools and recommendations on how to prevent their occurrence in the future.
The main objective of this paper was to contribute to closing this gap. To that purpose, we conducted an empirical investigation of the efficiency and pricing of the emerging ADR market. More specifically, we first identified two fundamental relationships that arbitrage considerations impose on returns of depositary receipts and their local counterparts. The first one, between the dollar return for an ADR and the dollar return for the underlying security, arises from the law of one price, ceteris paribus for various financial frictions, and should always hold unless "normal" market conditions are violated. The second one, between ADR returns and global sources of risk, is the result of perfectly open and fully integrated financial markets. Then, we tested for a regime shift in each of these relations in our sample of ADRs from issuers in 20 emerging countries using the non-parametric technique of Bai et al. (1998) .
We provided evidence that, during recent episodes of financial turmoil (Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2002)), those normal market conditions were in fact violated. Therefore, our evidence suggests that such episodes were not the result of natural dependencies, but indeed "crises." In particular, we found that a majority of the depositary receipts in our sample experienced statistically and economically significant structural shifts in their efficiency and pricing relationships over the past decade. The estimated chronology of these breaks suggests that financial crises involving emerging economies were accompanied by lower efficiency in the ADR market, greater market segmentation, and more intense generation of information in the less liquid local markets.
Finally, using a Poisson regression model, we provided support for some of the available explanations of financial crises in emerging economies, by showing that the estimated regime shifts in each country in our sample were more likely when uncertainty among (foreign) investors was greater and both financial and macroeconomic conditions were deteriorating. 0.5884 (7, 0) 0.0035
0.2853 (1) when it does not experience a statistically significant break (at the 5% level) for each emerging market in the sample.
Variables and statistics are defined in the notes to Table 1a 0.9235 (18, 6) n.a. n.a. 0.9112 (6, 2) n.a. n.a. 0.9218 (11, 5) n.a. n.a. 0.2929 (25) 0.1274 (37) -0.0975
Argentina 13 9 49.30 37.15% 0.8061 (9) 0.1705 (2) 0.0389
0.5965 0.4580
0.1943
China 14 8 20.62 24.63% 0.5838
-0.0983
0.1151 (4) 0.1865 (2) when it does not experience a statistically significant break (at the 5% level) for each emerging market in the sample. Variables and statistics have been defined in the notes to Table 1a 0.2654 (31) n.a. n.a. (17) 0.2112
n.a. n.a. 0.3422
n.a. n.a.
Hong Kong 6 4 8.14 15.97% 1.0619 (4) 0.3049 (1) n.a. n.a. 0.2000 (2) n.a. n.a. Peru 2 2 7.38 18.55% 1.2486 (2) 0.2589 (1) n.a. n.a. -0.3101 (1) n.a. n.a.
S. Korea 6 4 7.43 32.52% 0.8847 (4) 0.4061 (2) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Eqs. (7) and (8) each country m's stock market and in the U.S. stock market, respectively. For each country m, the sample over which the model is estimated starts on the first potential break date for the ADR with the earliest return data available (t 0 ); hence, N is the number of observations used for each country's estimation. For each of the estimated coefficients we report the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses. We also report two R 2 statistics which measure the improvement of the fit resulting from using λ 
; the second one, the Deviance
The goodness-of-fit statistic χ 2 tests the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients in Eq.
(8) are all zero. The p-values for this test are reported in parentheses. A " * " indicates significance at the 10% level, while " * * " indicate significance at the 5% level. Eqs. (7) and (8) 
(8) are all zero. The p-values for this test are reported in parentheses. A " * " indicates significance at the 10% level, while " * * " indicate significance at the 5% level. 0.0700 (1.14) 0.0121 
